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Abstract: 
 
The unique process of the ‘making’ of postcolonial states through the operation 
of international law is intrinsically connected to the suppression of ethnic 
minorities and the ensuing humanitarian catastrophes in these states. With the 
continuation of colonial boundaries in postcolonial states, international law 
facilitates many of these catastrophes. Exploring the questionable legal status 
of the uti possidetis principle in international law and the fallacy of its conflict-
preventing potential, I argue that uti possidetis itself is a key problem. The 
continuation of arbitrarily-drawn colonial boundaries undermines the 
legitimate right to self-determination of numerous ethnic minorities. This paper 
specifically explores the extension of uti possidetis to Myanmar and 
demonstrates how it contributed to the Rohingya crisis by depriving the 
Rohingya of their legitimate right to self-determination. In the process, the 
inherent relationship between colonialism and international law and the way 
they shape the future of postcolonial states is also highlighted.   
  
∗ Reader in International Law & Human Rights, Birmingham Law School, University of Birmingham, UK. I am 
thankful to the participants of the International Law and Disaster Workshop at the University of Melbourne for 
their comments on an earlier draft.  
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The recent persecution of the Rohingya minority in Myanmar has been described by the 
United Nations Human Rights Council, first, as a ‘textbook example of ethnic cleansing’1 
and then, within a few months, as a potential case of ‘genocide’ when the Council chief 
asked: ‘given the decades of statelessness imposed on the Rohingya, policies of 
dehumanising discrimination and segregation, and the horrific violence and abuse, along with 
the forced displacement and systematic destruction of villages, homes, property and 
livelihoods – can anyone rule out that elements of genocide may be present?’2 And finally, in 
its final report of August 2018 the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar 
established by the UN Human Rights Council concluded that Myanmar army has committed 
war crimes and crimes against humanity in Rakhine State, and also ‘there is sufficient 
information to warrant the investigation and prosecution of senior officials in the Tatmadaw 
[Myanmar military] chain of command, so that a competent court can determine their liability 
for genocide in relation to the situation in Rakhine State’.3  
International norms devised to protect the rights of minorities and to protect 
individuals from statelessness, together with the recently developed framework of 
Responsibility to Protect – all suggest that international law offers a solution to this tragic 
predicament of the Rohingya, the problem being the lack of enforcement. This paper, in 
contrast, is premised upon the general argument that international law, rather than being the 
solution, has paradoxically facilitated a number of similar or worse humanitarian disasters in 
recent times. This is because of how international law constructs postcolonial statehood. 
Diverse political entities with their own complex characteristics were compelled to adopt a 
Western concept of ‘statehood’ – which embodies specific ideas of territory, the nation, and 
ethnicity – in order to win recognition. As Anghie notes, ‘the embrace and adoption of the 
Western concept of the nation-state that was a prerequisite for becoming a sovereign state’ 
demanded a transformation of indigenous perceptions of sovereignty and political 
communities, and ‘not all new states were successful in making these changes without 
experiencing ongoing ethnic tensions and, in some cases, long and devastating civil wars.’4 
Similarly, Okafor argues that international legal doctrines such as ‘peer-review’ (as opposed 
to ‘infra-review’) in recognising new states and ‘homogenization’ of states have facilitated 
the process by which many African states have facilitated coercive nation-building and 
legitimised the construction and maintenance of large centralized states in Africa. In this way, 
international law and institutions have contributed to incidents of ethnic conflicts in Africa.5 
1 Statement made by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al-Hussein, before the UN 
Human Rights Council in Geneva on 11 September 2017. See, UN News Centre at: 
www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=57490#.WduURFtSyUk (last visited on 9 October 2017). 
2 Statement made by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al-Hussein, before the UN 
Human Rights Council in Geneva on 5 December 2017. See, UN News Centre at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22488&LangID=E (last visited on 
22 December 2017). 
3 UN Doc A/HRC/39/CRP.2 (2018). 
4 Antony Anghie, “Bandung and the Origins of Third World Sovereignty,” in Bandung, Global History, and 
International Law: Critical Pasts and Pending Futures, eds. Luis Eslava, Michael Fakhri and Vasuki Nesiah 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 544.  
5 See, Obiora Chinedu Okafor, “After Martyrdom: International Law, Sub-State Groups, and the Construction of 
Legitimate Statehood in Africa,” Harvard International Law Journal 41 (2000), 503-528. 
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Nation-building projects in most postcolonial states faced the challenging task of 
reconciling two diverging forces: “nationalism” and “liberal universalism”. Nationalism not 
only served as the vehicle of liberation movements against colonial rule but was also the key 
to independent statehood. Post-WWII liberal universalism, in contrast, promised a post-ethnic 
world order and became a template for the internal organisation of postcolonial states. The 
post-WWII phase of international law was indeed set for reaffirming faith in and promoting 
certain crucial values: fundamental human rights, dignity and worth of individuals, equal 
rights of men and women and of nations large and small, among others.6 In this new era, 
however, “progress” equated to liberal values, and universalism simply meant the imposition 
of these values at a global scale.7 Thus, since the inception of the UN, an individualist notion 
of human rights has become the dominant vocabulary through which the concept of 
‘minority’ is expressed. It appeared convincing to replace the minority protection system with 
the human rights regime exclusively centred on the universal protection of individual rights.8 
These diverging forces operated within the political boundaries that were arbitrarily 
drawn by colonial powers and inherited by postcolonial states at the time of decolonisation. 
In the absence of stable democratic institutions, subsequent nation-building projects and the 
ensuing suppression of ethnic groups who were outside the state-sponsored national culture 
often went unchallenged. The difficulties of postcolonial statehood have been most notable in 
Africa, where boundaries were drawn with no regard for political and social realities on the 
ground. Similar problems, however, accompanied the independence of Asian countries from 
colonial rule. The recent Rohingya crisis in Myanmar is an archetypical example of this.  
Postcolonial states are essentially the creation, via colonisation and decolonisation, of 
the international legal norms and associated rules crafted by Europe.9 International law has 
contributed to the formation of postcolonial statehood and the ensuing atrocities in a number 
of ways, involving a wide range of issues, such as the drawing of postcolonial boundaries, 
responses to nationalist aspirations of the oppressed minority, the question of citizenship and 
statelessness, economic liberalisation and prioritisation of economic development over 
human rights, and humanitarian assistance, intervention and crisis management. The present 
paper deals with international law of postcolonial boundaries, and demonstrates how the 
continuation of colonial boundaries in postcolonial Myanmar is intrinsically connected to the 
Rohingya crisis. 
The problem of colonial boundaries has been widely discussed in relation to conflicts 
in Africa. Those borders have been established in accordance with the legal principle of uti 
possidetis which dictates that colonial borders must be respected. This principle has been 
adopted in order to curtail ongoing ethnic conflict in Africa. In this article, exploring the 
origins of uti possidetis and its extension to Asia, I demonstrate the questionable legal status 
of the uti possidetis principle, and also the fallacy of its conflict-evading potential. In contrast 
6 See, the Preamble of the UN Charter (1945). 
7 Mohammad Shahabuddin, “Liberal Self-Determination, Postcolonial Statehood, and Minorities: The 
Chittagong Hill Tracts in Context,” Jahangirnagar University Journal of Law 1(2013), 82-83. 
8 For an in-depth analysis of why the liberal individualist approach to minority protection was counter-
productive by design, see Mohammad Shahabuddin, Ethnicity and International Law: Histories, Politics, and 
Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 136-164. 
9 See, Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). 
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to the conventional wisdom that uti possidetis is essential for settling boundary disputes 
among postcolonial states and thereby maintaining peace and order, I argue that uti possidetis 
itself is a key problem. Far from being a corrective to potential “disorder” emanating from 
decolonisation, the continuation of arbitrarily-drawn colonial boundaries undermines the 
legitimate right to self-determination of numerous ethnic minorities in postcolonial states and 
often results in violent ethnic conflicts. Its embrace by postcolonial Asian states, in this case 
Myanmar, has furthered rather than curtailed violence. In this connection, I also argue that 
the current violence suffered by the Rohingya cannot be understood except by studying the 
complex history of Rakhine State and its relationship with pre-colonial Burma and then, the 
British Empire. It is this history which created the colonial boundaries that are still enforced 
in ways that preserve an insecure postcolonial state which has systematically oppressed the 
Rohingya people. Genocide is the result.  
  
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POSTCOLONIAL BOUNDARIES 
 
Following the Great War, when the then US President Woodrow Wilson declared the right to 
self-determination as one of the governing principles of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, 
the Indian Home Rule League of America submitted a petition to the Great Powers of the 
Conference arguing a case for India’s independence under this principle.10 Abraham argues 
that the petition was also a response to the Wilsonian idea of self-determination that 
subjugated peoples need to ‘conform to the identity of one people-one land-one state to be 
accepted as having legitimate claim to political personhood’.11 Lacking these elements, 
protagonists of anticolonial nationalist movements in general ‘sought to redefine the prime 
criterion for independent statehood as unified political control over a defined piece of land, or 
territorial sovereignty’.12 Thus, refuting the proposition that India is not a ‘nation’ due to its 
racial and cultural diversity, the petition puts forward what it calls a ‘modern’ understanding 
of the nation based on Lord Acton’s proposition on this subject: a nation is a moral and 
political being, developed in the course of history by the action of the State and the idea that a 
nation itself should constitute a State is contrary to modern civilization.13 Based on Acton 
and relying on the promising prospect of the principle of federalism to unify multiple 
nationalities within the postcolonial Indian state, the petition concluded that ‘to require races 
of India to coalesce into a nation with one religion and one tongue, is midsummer madness’; 
instead, a territorially defined Indian nation-state was the solution.14 The petition fell on deaf 
ears, as we know, but the interwar principle of self-determination solidified the idea of the 
sovereign, territorially bound nation-state, wherein the majority got to control State apparatus 
while the minority found itself in a position of perpetual subordination, often under minority 
protection treaties. 
10 India Home Rule League of America, Self-Determination for India (New York: India Home Rule League of 
America, 1919).   
11 Itty Abraham, How India Became Territorial: Foreign Policy, Diaspora, Geopolitics (Palo Alto: Stanford 
University Press, 2014), 11. 
12 Ibid., 12. 
13 India Home Rule League of America, Self-Determination for India, 9-10. 
14 Ibid., 10. 
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In the aftermath of the Second World War the idea of self-determination was 
primarily expressed through decolonisation. In fact, as Rosalyn Higgins demonstrates, before 
the claim for decolonisation gained prominence in the discourse on self-determination, the 
mention of self-determination in the UN Charter simply meant equal rights of all states to 
non-interference in their internal affairs.15 It was through the activism of the new states of 
Asia and Africa in the General Assembly that the concept of self-determination turned into 
the moral and legal force behind decolonisation.16 
However, at the same time, the nationalist elites often representing the majority 
interest in these countries saw themselves as the legitimate and sole successors of colonial 
rule, and conceived of the colonial state as a necessary mode of transition to a “modern” 
postcolonial state.17 Abraham notes that as early as 1947, in the Asian Relations Conference 
in Delhi, all the delegates had consensus on the absolute acceptance of the nation-state 
mold.18 Consequently, it also emerged that  
[t]he Asian political entities soon to be free were uniformly represented as states composed as national 
majorities joined by ethnic or cultural minorities. […] Communities marked by difference from these 
national majorities were being recast as aliens and outsiders, notwithstanding their long residence in 
these countries. […] Under these circumstances, all that could be hoped for was goodwill on the part of 
majority communities leading to legal and constitutional protections for these “new” minorities. The 
Asian Relations Conference made it clear that political independence for Asia would mean a state 
dominated by a nation defined in terms of an autochthonous majority community.19  
The normative need for continuity from the colonial state to the postcolonial nation-
state to be governed by nationalist elites, and the pragmatic need to avoid letting “chaos” 
arise from decolonisation were both addressed by the international law principle of uti 
possidetis, i.e., maintaining colonial borders for postcolonial states. Thus, while the ethnic 
notion of self-determination in the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 attempted to undo 
established borders in order to create states along ethnic lines, the post-WWII application of 
uti possidetis principles cemented the territorial borders that had been arbitrarily drawn by the 
colonial powers20 and enforced the multi-ethnic composition of the postcolonial states.21  
15 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), 111–114. See also, Shahabuddin, Ethnicity and International Law, 136-137. 
16 See, United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Granting of Independence to the Colonial 
Countries and Peoples, Res 1514 (XV), 947th Plenary Meeting, 14 December  1960; General Assembly, 
Principles which should Guide Members in Determining whether or not an Obligation Exists to Transmit the 
Information Called for under Article 73 e of the Charter, Res 1541 (XV), 948th Plenary Meeting, 15 December  
1960; General Assembly, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Res 2625 (XXV), 25th 
Session, 24 October  1970. See also, Thomas D. Musgrave, Self-Determination and National Minorities 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 69-77, 91-96. 
17 See, Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse (London: Zed 
Books Ltd., 1993 [1986]), 1–35; Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe – Postcolonial Thought and 
Historical Difference (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), 27-46. 
18 Abraham, How India Became Territorial, 69. 
19 Ibid. 
20 However, the option of changing territorial borders by voluntarily joining another State or by remaining in a 
constitutional relationship with the former colonial Power remained open. See, General Assembly, Principles 
which should Guide Members in Determining whether or not an Obligation Exists to Transmit the Information 
Called for under Article 73 e of the Charter, principles VI–IX.   
21 Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
149.  
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The Colonial Declaration of 1960 proclaimed that ‘[a]ll peoples have the right to self-
determination’ and that ‘by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.’22 But at the same time, the 
Declaration stipulated that all states shall faithfully and strictly respect the sovereign rights of 
all peoples and their territorial integrity, and also made it explicit that ‘[a]ny attempt aimed at 
the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is 
incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations’.23 As the 
comment of the Moroccan delegate in the drafting process of the Declaration reveals, the 
Asian and African States that drafted the Declaration were concerned about the  attempts by 
colonial powers – in line with their longstanding  policy of ‘divide and rule’ – to carve up 
colonies that were in the process of achieving independence.24 The emphasis on territorial 
integrity was a clear attempt to counter such colonial practices. However, this has 
simultaneously restricted the application of self-determination to various minority groups and 
their nationalist aspiration for independent statehood, and thereby reinforced the colonial 
borders in Asia and Africa. 
As a matter of fact, General Assembly debates on the draft Declaration were taking 
place at a time when the crisis involving the Katangese secessionist attempt was unfolding. 
The Katanga crisis was explicitly referred to in the debate to highlight the salience of the 
provisions on territorial integrity in the declaration.25 When the Republic of Congo got 
independence from Belgium in 1960, the mineral-rich province of Katanga too declared its 
independence from Congo with active support and protection from the Belgians.26 Following 
the outbreak of a civil war, the Congolese government sought assistance from the UN, which 
asked Belgium to immediately withdraw its troops from Congo.27 The UN position on the 
Katanga question made it very clear that the right to self-determination belongs to Congo as a 
whole and any breach of its territorial integrity was not permissible under any claim of self-
determination by any other group. The Katanga case, in this sense, exemplifies an 
international consensus regarding the continuity of colonial boundaries and its limiting effect 
on the right to self-determination of other sub-national groups in the new postcolonial state. 
Similarly, in the General Assembly debate on the Colonial Declaration, the 
Indonesian delegate made frequent references to the situation in West Irian (New Guinea) to 
highlight the importance of territorial integrity in the context of the right to self-
determination.28 Following more than 300 years of Dutch rule and a short period of Japanese 
occupation between 1942 and 1945 when Indonesia finally achieved independence in 1949, 
the former colonial power, the Netherlands, disputed the legal status of West Irian on the 
ground that the 700,000 inhabitants of the island were racially and culturally distinct from the 
22 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to the Colonial Countries and Peoples, Article 2. 
23 Ibid., Articles 6 & 7. 
24 See, the Moroccan delegate’s comments at UN Doc A/PV.947 (14 December 1960) 1284, paras 158- 
161. 
25 Ibid. 
61. 
26 For details, see, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium), Judgment of 
14 Feb 2002 [2002] ICJ Rep 3 at paras 6-15, Judge Ad Hoc Bula, separate opinion.  
27 UN Doc S/4382 (13 July 1960) 1; SC Res 143, 14 July 1960; SC Res 161, 21 February 1961. 
28 See, UN Doc A/PV.936 (1960) 1153, paras 53-55. 
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Indonesians.29 On the other hand, Indonesia argued that the foundation of the nation had a 
territorial, rather than a racial, basis and was rooted in common suffering endured during the 
Dutch colonial rule.30 This territorial argument had some relevance, in that, as Anghie notes, 
given the artificiality of boundaries of most postcolonial states, having race as the legitimate 
basis of the postcolonial nation state would dismantle almost all Asian and African states.31 
However, Indonesia also relied on the colonial ideology of ‘civilisation’ in arguing that 
‘people of West Irian were too “primitive” to exercise the right of self-determination in a 
conventional way’ – a comment that offended many African nations.32 Although following 
the adoption of the Colonial Declaration, the Dutch position – supported by a group of 
francophone African states – was in favour of granting the people of West Irian the right to 
self-determination, Indonesia successfully used the General Assembly forum to press the 
demand for its territorial integrity under international law,33 and finally turned to open 
realism by invading the island in May 1962.34 Although under the US mediation, the people 
of West Irian got the right to express their free choice to decide on their political future, the 
actual expression took place only under direct influence of Indonesia – to the extent that only 
slightly more than 1% of the total West Irian population were selected by Indonesian 
Administration as special delegates, who overwhelmingly voted in favour of Indonesian rule. 
Despite knowledge of these irregularities, the UN refrained from any further action in this 
regard.35            
Likewise, subsequent General Assembly Resolutions as well as decisions of the 
International Court of Justice also unequivocally declared the primacy of territorial integrity 
of states over ethnic claims for self-determination.36 As Craven notes, ‘the old opposition 
between self-determination and uti possidetis lost its decisive import by reason of the 
impossibility of self-determination meaning anything but independence within inherited 
borders – once the “self” had been identified, any determination could operate only within the 
parameters of its own existence.’37 Franck sees this pattern as a move towards 
‘reconciliation’; in his words: ‘The disintegration of Spanish imperialism in America 
produced the norm of uti possidetis. The end of the German, Austrian, and Ottoman empires 
[in the interwar period] gave rise to self-determination. In the post-1945 era uti possidetis and 
29 See, Thomas Franck, Nation Against Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 77; see also, 
Anghie, “Bandung and the Origins of Third World Sovereignty,” 544-546.  
30 United Nations, Revue des Nations Unies 6, no. 2 (1957), 67. 
31 Anghie, “Bandung and the Origins of Third World Sovereignty,” 545. 
32 Ibid., 546; see also, Michla Pomerance, “Methods of Self-Determination and the Argument of 
‘Primitiveness’,” Canadian Yearbook of International Law 12 (1974), 51-52, 55. The Dutch vested interest in 
destabilising the region and thereby perpetuating its control cannot be ignored here. See, Kalana Senaratne, 
“Internal Self-Determination: A Critical Third World Perspective,” Asian Journal of International Law 3, no. 2 
(2013), 331-332.   
33 The resolution in favour of West Irian self-determination was marginally defeated by 53 votes to 41 votes 
with nine abstentions. See, UN Doc A/L.368 (27 Nov 1961). 
34 Franck, Nation Against Nation, 78. 
35 Report of the Secretary General Concerning the Act of Self-Determination in West Irian. UN Doc 
A/7723, Agenda item 98 (6 November 1969). 
36 See Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 1970. See also Legal Consequences for States of 
the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1971), 
para. 52; Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso and Mali) Case, ICJ Reports (1986), para. 25.  
37 Matthew Craven, The Decolonisation of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 205.  
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self-determination were redefined and synthesised into a doctrine of decolonisation.’38 In this 
‘reconciliation’, however, uti possidetis clearly trumped over the principle of self-
determination so far as minority groups, now entangled in postcolonial states, are concerned.   
Uti possidetis was originally defined under Roman law in cases in which two 
individuals disagreed as to ownership. It was a provisional remedy based on possession and 
pending a final judicial determination. The principle reappeared in the early eighteenth 
century in conjunction with the concept of the status quo post bellum (the state of possession 
existing at the conclusion of war), though still connected with the fact of possession.39 The 
modern formulation of the uti possidetis principle is traditionally associated with the 
decolonisation of Central and South America in the nineteenth century. When the newly 
independent Latin American states mutually agreed, in some cases, to adopt former Spanish 
administrative lines as their new international boundaries, the practice came to be seen as the 
implementation of the uti possidetis principle.40  
The principle of uti possidetis reappeared again in the interwar period in relation to 
the dispute between Finland and Sweden over the Aaland Islands (Ahuenanmaa). Finland, 
including the Aaland Islands, was a part of the Swedish administrative region of Åbo (Turku) 
for more than six centuries beginning from 1159. It was only in 1809 that Czarist Russia 
under Alexander I took control of Finland from the Swedish kingdom. Following the 
Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the ensuing disintegration of Czarist Russia, Finland 
declared independence from Russia. The Aalanders demanded the right to break with Finland 
and re-unite with their co-ethnics in Sweden.41 The League of Nations assigned the task of 
determining whether the dispute was international in nature, and therefore fell under the 
jurisdiction of the League, to a Commission of Jurists. This Commission questioned the 
proposition of an ipso facto application of the uti possidetis principle: 
The Aaland Islands were undoubtedly part of Finland during the period of Russian rule. Must they, for 
this reason alone, be considered as definitely incorporated de jure in the State of Finland which was 
formed as a result of the events described above? The Commission finds it impossible to admit this.42  
However, the Commission of Rapporteurs, appointed subsequently by the League to prepare 
the way for a solution to this dispute, held the opposite view, on the grounds, inter alia, of the 
uti possidetis principle subject to guarantees obtained from the Finnish government for the 
protection of the Swedish language and culture of the Islanders.43 In the opinion of the 
Rapporteurs, since the Aaland Islands were part of the Finnish Province of Åbo Björneborg 
under Czarist Russia, upon Finnish independence the application of uti possidetis principle 
38 Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, 147.  
39 See generally, Suzanne Lalonde, Determining Boundaries in a Conflicted World: The Role of uti possidetis 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 10-23.  
40 Ibid., 4. 
41 See generally, James Barros, The Aland Islands Question: Its Settlement by the League of Nations (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968). 
42 Aaland Islands Case, Report of the International Commission of Jurists, League of Nations Official Journal, 
Special Supplement No. 3 (1920), 9. 
43 The Commission of Rapporteurs took into consideration a number of other factors, including the small size of 
the island community as a claimant of the right to self-determination and also the security concerns for both 
Sweden and Finland. Their report also observed that the sheet of water, the skiftet with its numerous rocks and 
islets, which separated the islands from the Finnish mainland “would be a bad frontier between two States, 
extremely arbitrary from a geographical point of view.” See, Aaland Islands Case, Report of the Commission of 
Rapporteurs (1921), League of Nations Council Doc B7 [C] 21/68/106, 3. 
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should guarantee Finland’s pre-independence territory.44 The League Council adopted the 
view of the Rapporteurs and finally recommended that the Aaland Islands should belong to 
Finland.      
Against this backdrop, the centrality of the uti possidetis principle in the international 
legal imagination of boundaries of new states soon got a stronger foothold in the context of 
African decolonisation. When, in 1964, the member states of the Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU; now African Union) pledged to respect the colonial boundaries existing at the 
time of independence, the International Court of Justice and many commentators viewed the 
resolution as further evidence of the role of uti possidetis in the process of decolonisation.45 
Although prior to independence, many African political parties advocated the readjustment of 
these artificial boundaries to accord with local realities,46 such revisionist claims lost ground 
as African colonies started emerging as independent states and prioritised a peaceful 
transition to statehood. The Charter of the OAU affirmed in Article 3(3) every member’s 
adherence to ‘respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its 
inalienable right to independent existence’.47 In a meeting in Cairo the following year, the 
OAU adopted a resolution reaffirming ‘the strict respect by all member States of the 
Organisation for the principles laid down in Article III, paragraph 3 of the Charter’ and 
declared ‘that all member States pledge themselves to respect the frontiers existing on their 
achievement of national independence’.48 The Katanga experience was surely fresh in the 
minds of African leaders. 
It is generally believed that this acceptance of the continuity of the colonial borders 
represents the Latin American principle of uti possidetis applied in the African context.49 
Thus, through the operation of international law the boundaries of colonial Africa drawn at 
the Berlin Conference of 1883–1885 without regard to demographics or culture but based on 
astronomical or mathematical criteria or by reference to prominent physical features came to 
be the permanent boundaries of postcolonial African states. As Griffiths notes, ‘[t]he political 
map of colonial Africa was virtually complete by 1914 and there has been little subsequent 
change. During the next 50 years, that colonial boundary mesh would become the almost 
exact basis for territorial division of independent Africa which would then be fossilised by 
the resolution of the Organisation of African Unity in 1964.’50 
 This view that the uti possidetis principle should be applied in governing postcolonial 
territorial delimitation was shared by the ICJ Chamber in the Burkina Faso vs. Mali case, in 
which the Chamber declared that uti possidetis was a ‘general principle’ and a ‘rule of 
44 Aaland Islands Case, Report of the Commission of Rapporteurs (1921), League of Nations Council Doc B7 
[C] 21/68/106. 
45 Lalonde, Determining Boundaries in a Conflicted World, 4. 
46 For example, the resolution proclaimed by the All-African Peoples Conference held in Accra in December 
1958, which called for the abolition or readjustment of colonial frontiers at an early date. See, Lalonde, 
Determining Boundaries in a Conflicted World, 103. 
47 Adopted in Addis Ababa on 25 May 1963, 479 UNTS 39.  
48 “OAU Resolution of Border Disputes,” in Basic Documents on African Affairs, ed. Ian Brownlie (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1971), 360. See also, Lalonde, Determining Boundaries in a Conflicted World, 104. 
49 See, for example, Brownlie, Basic Documents on African Affairs, 360; A. O. Chukwurah, “The Organisation 
of African Unity and African Territorial and Boundary Problems: 1963–1973,” Indian Journal of International 
Law 13, no. 2 (1973), 181; Boutros Ghali, The Addis Ababa Charter (New York: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1964), 29.  
50 Ieuan Ll. Griffiths, The Atlas of African Affairs, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1995 [1984]), 51. 
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general scope’ for all cases of decolonisation.51 Although the first use of the principle 
involved the decolonisation process of the Latin American colonies belonging to a single 
colonial power, i.e., Spain, the principle of uti possidetis, the Chamber continued, ‘is not a 
special rule which pertains solely to one specific system of international law. It is a general 
principle, which is logically connected with the phenomenon of the obtaining of 
independence, wherever it occurs.’52 The Chamber, thus, concluded: ‘It was for this reason 
that, as soon as the phenomenon of decolonisation characteristic of the situation in Spanish 
America in the 19th century subsequently appeared in Africa in the 20th century, the 
principle of uti possidetis […] fell to be applied.’53 
 However, this depiction of uti possidetis as the general principle of international law 
to be applied in all decolonisation situations has been challenged in recent scholarship. 
Ahmed, for example, argues that even in the Latin American context the key purpose of the 
uti possidetis principle in the nineteenth century was to avoid any possibility of terra nullius 
and, thereby, unify the entire Latin America in the face of a renewed threat of Spanish 
imperialism.54 The argument therefore follows that uti possidetis was not a general principle 
of international law at the time of African decolonisation, and ‘did not give rise to the 
concept of intangibility of inherited frontiers, and was as such inapplicable to Africa on 
independence’.55 Hence, by accepting the pre-existing frontiers in the absence of any binding 
international rules, African states created new customary rules – an achievement that the ICJ 
erroneously undermined in the Frontier case by imposing the uti possidetis principle on 
Africa as a binding general principle of international law.56    
 Similarly, examining many of the constitutions of and treaties between Latin 
American states in the period following independence, Lalonde challenges the mainstream 
position that the Latin American republics consistently accepted the uti possidetis principle in 
determining their new boundaries.57 She highlights various conflicting versions of the 
principle within Latin America, such as uti possidetis juris (claimed by most Spanish 
colonies) and uti possidetis de facto (claimed for example by Brazil, which happened to be a 
Portuguese colony), as evidence of inconsistent state practice.58 These conflicting claims, 
together with practical difficulties encountered in the application of the principle and 
international awards based on alternative principles, led Lalonde to conclude that uti 
possidetis never achieved the status of a general principle of international law emanating 
from the Latin American experience of decolonisation.59 Likewise, she found the application 
51 ICJ Reports 1986, 565. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Dirdeiry M. Ahmed, Boundaries and Secession in Africa and International Law: Challenging Uti Possidetis 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 20-24. He relies on a number of cases that support this claim: 
Colombian-Venezuelan Frontier case, Reports of International Arbitral Awards (RIAA), VI 1922, 223; Beagle 
Channel case [Case concerning a Dispute between Argentina and Chile concerning the Beagle Channel] (1977) 
XXI RIAA 1, 81–82; El Salvador/Honduras case [Case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier 
Dispute] (Judgment,  1992), ICJ Rep 315, 387; Nicaragua/Honduras case [Territorial and Maritime Dispute 
between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea] (Judgment, 2007), ICJ Rep 659, 707.  
55 Ahmed, Boundaries and Secession in Africa and International Law, 46. 
56 See generally, ibid., 11-46. 
57 See generally, Lalonde, Determining Boundaries in a Conflicted World, 24-60. 
58 Ibid., 31-34. 
59 Ibid., 58-60. 
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of uti possidetis in the African context driven rather by a practical sense of necessity, and not 
by any sense of legally binding nature of the principle.60    
Yet, uti possidetis continued to dominate the international legal imagination in 
relation to boundary making. The principle was applied even in a non-colonial context 
following the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. When Lord 
Carrington, the President of the Conference on Yugoslavia, referred to the Badinter 
Commission the question of whether the Republics’ declaration of independence amounted to 
secession from the SFRY, the Commission held that ‘in the case of a federal-type state, 
which embraces communities that possess a degree of autonomy and, moreover, participate in 
the exercise of political power within the framework of institutions common to the 
Federation, the existence of the state implies that the federal organs represent the components 
of the Federation and wield effective power’.61 Given that the Republics had declared their 
independence, and the composition and workings of the essential organs of the Federation 
ceased to meet the criteria of participation and representation inherent in a federal state, the 
Commission decided in Opinion no. 1 that the SFRY was in the process of dissolution.62 This 
Opinion was accompanied by the recognition of the Republics as independent States by the 
European Community and the US, subject to the provisions stipulated in the twin declarations 
on the guidelines for recognition of these states.63 The Opinion of the Commission and the 
recognition policy of the West cemented the statehood of these new States, and thereby 
turned the ostensibly ethnic conflict into an international conflict – an issue of Serbian 
aggression. As a corollary, the Commission declared in Opinion no. 3 (concerning the 
question of whether the internal boundaries between Croatia and Serbia and between Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Serbia should be regarded as frontiers for the purpose of public 
international law) that in the circumstances of the emergence of new states following the 
dissolution of the SFRY, both the external and internal frontiers of the SFRY had to be 
respected.64 The Commission categorically mentioned that this conclusion followed from the 
principle of respect for the territorial status quo and, in particular, from the principle of uti 
possidetis, which, though initially applied in settling decolonisation issues, was recognised as 
a general principle, as stated by the International Court of Justice in the Burkina Faso–Mali 
case.65 In other words, the internal boundaries of the SFRY were converted to protected 
60 Ibid., 103-137. 
61 Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission Opinion No. 1 (1991), European Journal of International 
Law 3 (1992), 182. 
62 Ibid., 183. In its Opinion No. 8 on 8 July 1992, the Commission declared that the process of dissolution of the 
SFRY was complete. See Arbitration Commission Opinion No. 8 (1992), European Journal of International 
Law 4 (1993), 87–88.  
63 See, the Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet 
Union (16 December 1991), European Journal of International Law 3 (1993), 72; the Declaration on 
Yugoslavia (Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 16 December 1991), European Journal of 
International Law 3 (1993), 73. 
64 Arbitration Commission Opinion No. 3 (1991), European Journal of International Law 3 (1992), 185. The 
Commission, in its support, specifically referred to the principles stated in the United Nations Charter, in the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV)) and in the 
Helsinki Final Act. 
65 Ibid. See also, Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso and Mali) Case, ICJ Reports (1986). 
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international frontiers, which could only be altered by an agreement. In an approving note, 
Pallet writes that the application of this principle was indispensable for maintaining peace.66 
The commission, thus, moved away from the conservative, ethnicity oriented political 
organisation of these new states and offered a liberal international legal vision of post-
conflict regional order in the Balkans. By considering the dissolution of the SFRY to be a 
breaking up of the federal units and then endorsing the existing boundaries of the republics, 
the commission envisaged Bosnia and Herzegovina as a non-ethnic unit in which Bosniac, 
Croat, and Serb ethnic groups would continue to live together.67 The Commission’s liberal 
non-ethnic vision of the nation-state was essentially in conflict with the conservative ethnic 
notion of the right to self-determination as claimed by Bosnian Serbs and Croats, who were 
keen to join their co-ethnics in Yugoslavia and Croatia, respectively. The Commission had to 
address this issue formally when Lord Carrington requested the Commission’s opinion on 
whether the Serbian population in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as one of the 
constituent peoples of Yugoslavia, had the right to self-determination. In conformity with its 
earlier Opinions, the Commission held in Opinion no. 2 that ‘whatever the circumstances, the 
right to self-determination must not involve changes to existing frontiers at the time of 
independence (uti possidetis juris) except where the states concerned agree otherwise’.68 In 
this regard, the commission did not deviate from the general international legal attitude 
towards this issue, as we have seen in relation to a number of cases and international 
instruments especially in the context of decolonization. At the European level, the 
International Commission of Jurists in the Aaland Island case declared the right to self-
determination, in the conservative sense, legally inapplicable as long as it challenges state 
sovereignty and international peace and stability.69 Similarly, although the Helsinki Final Act 
(1975) of the OSCE recognised that the right to self-determination goes beyond the colonial 
context, it nonetheless reiterated the primacy of the norms of territorial integrity and 
preservation of existing boundaries in international law.70 Thus, the Badinter Commission 
endorsed the uti possidetis principle as the governing principle of international law in the 
process of decolonisation, and went even further by reinforcing the application of this 
principle in delimiting international boundaries beyond the colonial context.   
In other words, despite questionable universality of uti possidetis, the principle 
continued to dominate the international legal imagination regarding the making of 
postcolonial boundaries. The proposition that the continuation of colonial boundaries will 
avoid territorial conflicts between and among postcolonial states informed invariably all 
66 He further asserts that ‘the principle is not as rigid as some might feel it ought to be. Stability does not mean 
intangibility. Although States are prohibited from acquiring a territory by force, they might freely decide, as the 
Committee made clear, to a modification of their frontiers “by agreement”’. See, Alain Pellet, “The Opinions of 
the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples,” European 
Journal of International Law 3 (1992), 180. For a critical perspective on the ‘Badinter frontiers Principle’, see, 
Peter Radan, “Post-secession International Borders: A Critical Analysis of the Opinions of the Badinter 
Arbitration Commission,” Melbourne University Law Review 24 (2000), 50-76.  
67 See, Shahabuddin, Ethnicity and International Law, 207. 
68 Arbitration Commission Opinion No. 2 (1991), European Journal of International Law 3 (1992), 184. 
69 See, Aaland Islands Case, Report of the International Commission of Jurists, League of Nations Official 
Journal, Sp. Supp. No. 3 (1920); cf. Aaland Islands Case, Report of the Commission of Rapporteurs (1921), 
League of Nations Council Doc. B7 [C] 21/68/106. However, the commission held that the right to self-
determination can be applied when statehood itself was in question. 
70 Cf. Principles IV and VI and Principle VIII of the Helsinki Final Act. 
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postcolonial and, also, non-colonial boundary settlements for new states. Even the critics of 
the universality of the uti possidetis principle do not always break with this pragmatic 
relevance of the principle. Thus, while Ahmed refuses to accept the application of the Latin 
American uti possidetis principle in the context of African decolonisation as a general 
principle of international law, he, nonetheless, does not generally dismantle the continuity of 
colonial boundaries – understood as a unique and novel creation of a African customary 
international law – for the pragmatic need of avoiding “chaos” emanating from 
decolonisation.71  
This consensus on the pragmatic need of the continuation of the colonial boundaries, 
along with the normative pull of the doctrine in general, is problematic. For, as I argue, far 
from being a corrective to potential “chaos”, the continuation of arbitrarily-drawn colonial 
boundaries undermines the legitimate right to self-determination of numerous ethnic 
minorities in postcolonial states and often results in violent ethnic conflicts. As we shall see 
in the following section, the boundaries of present-day Myanmar were crafted by the British 
colonial administration. These boundaries were then used by default for postcolonial 
Myanmar, in complete defiance of historical realities. I will demonstrate that the principle of 
the continuation of colonial borders for postcolonial statehood has deprived the Rohingya of 
their right to self-determination, and eventually led to the present crisis. 
 
  
II. THE ROHINGYA AND THE COLONIAL MAKING OF  
POSTCOLONIAL MYANMAR 
 
Rakhine State, located in western Myanmar, is one of the poorest states in Myanmar, fraught 
with ethnic conflicts between the Buddhist Rakhine and the minority Rohingya communities. 
Most Rohingya are Muslims, while a minority follow Hinduism. Although the Rakhine State 
as a whole face discriminatory treatment by Myanmar, the Rohingyas in northern Rakhine 
experience double-discrimination as they are historically subject to oppression by Rakhine 
Buddhists as well. Of around 1 million Rohingyas in Myanmar, nearly 700,000 are currently 
refugees in neighbouring Bangladesh, following successive military crackdowns, the one in 
August 2017 being the worst, genocidal in nature. 
During the British rule Rakhine state was known as ‘Arakan’ and I will be using this 
term hereinafter for the sake of clarity. The Rohingya were called Indo-Arakanese. In the 
Bengali literature of the medieval period, Arakan was referred to as ‘Roshang’.72 The 
historian of medieval Bengal Abdul Karim argues that the word ‘Rashang’ turned into 
‘Rohang’ in the colloquial use, and the people of the area thus came to be known as ‘Rohingi’ 
71 For a contrary argument, see, Makau Mutua, “Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry,” 
Michigan Journal of International Law 16, no. 4 (1995), 1113-1176.  
72 For instance, Syed Alaol’s reference to Arakan as ‘Roshang’ in his epic Padmabati (1651), or in Abdul Karim 
Khandkar’s preamble to his translation of the Persian story Dulla Majlish in 1698. See, Mofidul Hoque (ed.), 
The Rohingya Genocide: Compilation and Analysis of Survivors’ Testimonies (Dhaka: Center for the Study of 
Genocide and Justice, 2018), 64-65.  
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or ‘Rohingya’.73 The specific reference to the Rohingya as Muslims is a relatively recent 
phenomenon.  
Arakan, separated from the rest of Myanmar by a chain of mountains, maintained a 
distinct political identity for most of its history. In the official British narrative of the first 
Anglo-Burma War of 1824-1826, the century-old fort in Arakan and its defence arrangements 
received an admiring mention.74 Independent Arakan kingdoms can be traced back to 
antiquity and the last of them was established in 1430, with its capital in Mrauk U.75 Situated 
on the border between Buddhist and Muslim Asia, the kingdom had strong economic, trade 
and other relations with the Sultanate of Bengal.76 The relationship between Arakan kingdom 
and Bengal Sultanate deepened when the Arakanese king Min Saw-Mun (also known as 
Narameikha) was temporarily deposed of power by the Burmese and forced to take refuge in 
Bengal under the protection of Sultan Ghiasuddin Azam Shah. During his 20 years of exile in 
Bengal, the Arakanese king was so influenced by the coexistence of Persian, Arabic and 
Bengali cultures and traditions in the then Bengal that upon his return to power in 1426 with 
the help of Sultan’s army, the Arakanese king took with him several thousand Muslim 
courtesans and skilled persons from Bengal Sultanate.77 According to Phayre, the restored 
Arakanese king agreed to be a tributary to the Sultan of Bengal and even adopted an Arabic 
name and title for himself, i.e., Sulaiman Shah or Sawmun Shah, initially in fulfilment of the 
promise made to the Sultan.78 The practice continued for nearly two hundred years to show 
the matching grandeur of the Sultan of Bengal.79 However, the influence of Bengal Sultanate 
did not last for long. As Phayre notes, Sawmun Shah’s successor – his brother Meng Khari 
(known as Ali Khan) – did not submit to the authority of the Sultan; instead, taking full 
advantage of the weakness of the Sultanate, he took possession of territories in Bengal (e.g., 
Ramu in present-day Cox’s Bazar). Later, his son Basoahpyu annexed the post city of 
Chittagong in 1459 and kept under Arakanese control until the Mughals took it back, as we 
shall see later.80  
The medieval Bengali poet Syed Alaol (1607-1673), the court poet of the King of 
Arakan, in his epic Padmabati (1652) described Mrauk U as a truly cosmopolitan city where 
people of all faiths and races from all places had gathered.81 Buddhism reached Arakan 
73 See, Abdul Karim, The Rohingyas: A Short Account of Their History and Culture (Dhaka: Jatiya Sahitya 
Prakash, 2016), cited in Hoque (ed.), The Rohingya Genocide, 66. The Buddhist Rakhines were, however, 
popularly known as ‘Maghs’ to the Bangalees. 
74 Horace H. Wilson, Narrative of the Burmese War, 1824-1826 (London: W. H. Allen and Co,. 1852), 155-156. 
75 The Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, Towards a Peaceful, Fair and Prosperous Future for the People 
of Rakhine [Final Report of the Advisory Commission; also known as the Annan Commission], August 2017, 
18. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Hoque (ed.), The Rohingya Genocide, 62. 
78 Arthur Phayre, History of Burma (London: Trubner & Co., 1883), 78. 
79 Hoque (ed.), The Rohingya Genocide, 62. This was also a common practice in the Chakma tribe of the hill 
tracts of Chittagong under the control of the British East India Company. For example, the 18th century Chakma 
chief was named Sher Daulat Khan, his son Jan Baksh Khan, and his Deputy Rono Khan. See, Mohammad 
Shahabuddin, “The Myth of Colonial Protection of Indigenous Peoples: The Case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
under British Rule,” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 25, no. 2 (2018), 231.   
80 Phayre, History of Burma, 78. 
81 Alaol specifically mentions of people from Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Turkey, Abbysinia (Ethipia), Rome, 
Khurasan (greater Persia), Uzbekistan, Lahore, Multan, Sindh, Kashmir, Deccan, Hindustan (North India), 
Bengal, Karnal, Malaya, Kochi, Achi, and Karnataka. See, Hoque (ed.), The Rohingya Genocide, 64.  
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earlier than the interior of Burma. Given that Arakanese Buddhism served as an inspiration 
for the Buddhism in the rest of Burma, the Swiss Pali scholar and archaeologist Emanuel 
Forchhammer called Arakan the ‘Palestine of the Farther East’ in a publication of 1891.82 
Islam was introduced to Arakan beginning in the ninth century as Arab merchants arrived and 
carried trade with local Arakanese markets. Smart’s The Burma Gazetteer records that in the 
early ninth century ‘[s]everal ships were wrecked on Ramree island and the crews said to 
have been Mohammedans were sent to Arakan proper and settled in villages’.83 The Arab 
merchants gradually connected Arakan to the trade routes with the Middle East and the Far 
East, and thereby paved the way for long-lasting Arab and Islamic influence in Arakan.84 As 
Charney notes, they hardly formed any well-orginsed community given their small number.85 
However, he argues that large scale Muslim settlement took place in the sixteenth and the 
seventeenth centuries when the Arakanese and Portuguese communities started to raid 
southern Bengal transferring thousands of Bangalees to Arakan as slaves. According to his 
estimation, the Portuguese took around 147,000 captives between 1617 and 1666.86  
François Bernier’s Travels in the Mogul Empire, 1656-1668 informs that for many 
years the kingdom of Arakan was the home of several Portuguese settlers, a great number of 
Christian slaves, and half-caste Portuguese or other Europeans collected from various parts of 
the world.87 Many of them were involved in piracy. The King of Arakan, who lived in 
perpetual dread of the Mughals, kept these foreigners as advance guards for the protection of 
his frontier, even permitting them to occupy the Chittagong sea-port (in the south-eastern part 
of Bengal) within the Mughal territory.88 These pirates also invaded neighbouring seas, 
entered numerous arms and canals of the Ganges, and ravaged the islands of Lower Bengal.89 
Thus, when the Mughal Emperor Aurungzeb’s uncle, Shaista Khan, was sent to Bengal as the 
General of the Army and later elevated to the rank of the Governor of Bengal, his natural 
priority was to deliver Bengal from the cruel and incessant devastations of these pirates. 
Shaista Khan finally managed to free the port city of Chittagong from the control of pirates 
and isolate the pirates from Arakanese influence by threatening force and more effectively by 
offering a better life in Dhaka.90 However, in 1757, the defeat of the regime in Bengal against 
the British in the Battle of Plassey paved the way for British East India Company’s rule, first, 
in Bengal and gradually, in the rest of India. 
Meanwhile, the last independent kingdom of Arakan, after thriving for more than 350 
years as a prosperous trading hub, came under Burmese control in 1784-85. By the late 
eighteenth century, the Burmese had developed a sense of proto-nationalism with a common 
82 Emil Forchhammer, Report on the Antiquities of Arakan (Rangoon: Government Printing and Stationary, 
1891), 3. 
83 R. B. Smart, Burma Gazetteer (Rangoon: Government Printing and Stationary, 1917), 19. 
84 Hoque (ed.), The Rohingya Genocide, 61. 
85 Michael W. Charney, Where Jambudipa and Islamdom Converged: Religious Change and the Emergence of 
Buddhist Communalism in Early Modern Arakan (Fifteenth to Nineteenth Centuries), PhD dissertation, 
University of Michigan, 1999, 147. 
86 Ibid., 164-165. 
87 François Bernier, Travels in the Mogul Empire, 1656-1668 (Histoire de la dernière révolution des états du 
Grand Mogol, 1671), trans. Irving Brock, rev. ed. Archibald Constable (Westminster: Archibald Constable and 
Company, 1891).  
88 Ibid.  
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
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language, a common religion and a common set of legal and political ideas and institutions; 
even a shared written history existed throughout the core area of the Ava kingdom (Upper 
Burma – Mandalay).91 Thus consolidated and unified, the Ava Kingdom enjoyed 
unprecedented power internally and externally, and by the turn of the nineteenth century, the 
court of Ava could claim a series of spectacular successes on the battlefield.92 It was as part 
of this expansionist campaign towards the Western front that the annexation of Arakan took 
place.93 This annexation was indeed a massive operation, under the command of the Crown 
Prince, with three land forces of 13,706 armed men, 1,103 horsemen, 5,804 gunners, 300 
cannons, 8,412 visses94 of gun powder, and 41,686 cannonballs and also a naval force of 
1,848 gunners, 4,396 armed men, 165 boats carrying cannons, 633 cannons, 41,400 cannon 
balls, 769,500 gun shots and 16,185 flints.95 Political prisoners and criminals were also sent 
along with regular forces.96 The Arakanese capital city was taken and its King and many of 
his followers were captured on 20 January 1785. As soon as the victory was reported to the 
Burmese King, he ordered a great celebration on 26 January 1785 to mark this triumph over 
Arakan.97 
The war against Arakan was officially conceived as a religious war – a mission to re-
Buddhicise Arakan.98 Since Buddhism was on the wane there, the now-powerful Buddhist 
Kingdom of Ava took on the responsibility of re-establishing Buddhism in the region. Like 
many imperial powers throughout history who have brought historic artefacts to their centres 
of power as a physical demonstration of authority and/or a part of the official narrative of a 
glorious past and its revival under their leadership, the Burmese King moved Mahamuni (the 
iconic Great Image of Buddha), from Kyauktaw in North Arakan to Amarapura – the capital 
of Ava (presently in Mandalay).99 A Royal Order of Burma dated 16 October 1784 makes the 
point clear: ‘[The] Crown Prince shall march as Commander-in-Chief of Arakan Campaign to 
restore proper conditions in Arakan for the prosperity of the Buddha’s Religion.’100 Although 
instructions on the conduct of Burmese forces in this campaign prohibited the forcible taking 
of any young women or taking anything from the local people without payment, the Crown 
Prince was explicitly instructed to ‘clear the place of all bad characters’ so that Buddhism 
might prosper again in Arakan.101 A series of Buddhist missions were also sent to Arakan 
following annexation with the task of re-Buddhicizing the area, and local authorities were 
repeatedly ordered to extend full support to these missions so that they could build Ordination 
Halls at places of their choice.102 Various other political changes were also imposed. A Royal 
91 Thant Myint-U, The Making of Modern Burma (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 88. 
92 Ibid., 94. 
93 Ibid. 
94 A viss is a Burmese unit of measure for weight, equivalent to approximately 1.6. 
95 For details, see, Than Tun (ed.), The Royal Orders of Burma, AD 1598-1885, part IV (1782-1787) (Kyoto: 
Kyoto University Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, 1988), 75-83. 
96 See, Royal Orders of 28 September 1784 and 2 October 1784. 
97 See, Royal Orders of 26 January 1785 in ibid., 54. 
98 See generally, Than Tun, “Paya Lanma – Lord’s Highway, over the Yoma - Yakhine Range,” Journal of 
Asian and African Studies 25 (1983), 233-241. 
99 Tun (ed.), The Royal Orders of Burma, AD 1598-1885, part IV (1782-1787), xvii. The raft that brought 
Mahamuni arrived at the Amarapura jetty on 27 April 1785. 
100 Ibid., 75, 83. 
101 Ibid., 83, 84. 
102 See, Royal Orders of 25 July 1787 in ibid., 152 and Royal Orders of 3 October 1787 in ibid., 180. 
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Order of 14 October 1787 makes clear that since Arakan was now part of the Burmese 
kingdom, the people of Arakan must not continue using their former seals and coins.103 
Unsurprisingly, following the Burmese invasion, great numbers of the native 
population ‘fled from the cruelty and oppression of their conquerors, and either found an 
asylum in the British territory of Chittagong, or secreted themselves amongst the hills and 
thickets, and alluvial islands along its southern and eastern boundaries’.104 These Arakanese 
occasionally launched attacks on the invading Burmese in Arakan from Chittagong, thereby 
triggering tension between the Burmese kingdom and its new neighbour – the British.105 At 
the same time, Myint-U notes, this conquest brought a significant number of ritualists, 
astronomers and other learned men from Arakan into the Ava court. The Arakanese had close 
contact with centres of knowledge in India and the wider Islamic world and introduced 
important religious and secular texts on science, medicine and astrology to the Burmese.106  
With military, cultural and intellectual rejuvenation, the Burmese kingdom engaged 
more assertively, though still cautiously, with the British. Captain T. H. Lewin, the Deputy 
Commissioner of the Chittagong Hill Tracts under the Government of Bengal in 1866–1869 
and 1871–1874, records two letters dated around 24 June 1787 and sent by the King of 
Burma and the Rajah of Arakan to the British administration in Chittagong (among the 
earliest written communication between them). The first letter, from the Rajah of Arakan 
(now a vassal of the Burmese King) claims:  
[Some inhabitants of Arakan] have absconded and taken refuge near the mountains within your border, 
and exercise depredations on the people belonging to both countries. […] It is not proper that you 
should give asylum to them or the other Mughs who have absconded from Arracan, and you will do 
right to drive them from your country, that our friendship may remain perfect, and that the road of 
travellers and merchants may be secured. If you do not drive them from your country and give them up, 
I shall be under the necessity of seeking them out with an army, in whatever part of your territories 
they may be.107 
To substantiate this threat of invasion, the Rajah mentions in the same letter that he took 
similar actions earlier when the British refused to hand over another Arakanese fugitive, 
named Keoty.108 The second letter came from the King of Burma himself:  
As the country of Arracan lies contiguous to Chittagong, if a treaty of commerce were established 
between me and the English, perfect unity and alliance would ensure from such engagements. I 
therefore have submitted it to you that the merchants of your country should resort hither for the 
purpose of purchasing pearls, ivory, wax, and that in return my people should be permitted to resort to 
Chittagong for the purpose of trafficking in such commodities as the country may afford; but as the 
Mughs [from Arakan] residing at Chittagong have deviated from the principles of religion and 
morality, they ought to be corrected for their errors and irregularities […]. I have accordingly sent four 
103 Ibid., 182. 
104 Wilson, Narrative of the Burmese War, 1824-1826, 3-4; see also, A. K. M. Ahsan Ullah, “Rohingya 
Refugees to Bangladesh: Historical Exclusions and Contemporary Marginalisation,” Journal of Immigrant & 
Refugee Studies, 9 (2011), 143. 
105 Wilson, Narrative of the Burmese War, 1824-1826, 3-4. 
106 Myint-U, The Making of Modern Burma, 96. 
107 See, T. H. Lewin, The Hill Tracts of Chittagong and Dwellers Therein with Comparative Vocabularies of the 
Hill Dialect (Calcutta: Bengal Printing Company Ltd., 1869), 29. 
108 Ibid. This Burmese claim can be corroborated by the official British narrative of the first Anglo-Burma War. 
See, Wilson, Narrative of the Burmese War, 1824-1826, 8.   
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elephants’ teeth under the charge of 30 persons, who will return with your answer to the above 
proposals and offers of alliance.109 
  
The threats were in fact real, for almost immediately after this correspondence a force 
of armed Burmese entered Chittagong from Arakan. This incursion was reported to the 
Governor-General Lord Cornwallis in the same month, June 1787, by the Chief of 
Chittagong.110 Again in 1795, a Burmese Army of 5,000 men invaded Chittagong to pursue 
some rebellious Chiefs from Arakan.111 It is therefore evident that tension was building up 
between the Burmese and the British authorities around the emigration of certain Arakanese 
Chiefs and the ensuing Burmese raids into the British territories. At the macro level, there 
was a general sense of fear within the Burmese power-circles about the East India Company’s 
incessant expansion in India. During the first two decades of the nineteenth century, the 
Burmese sent a number of missions to the Mughal court and established contacts with Nepal, 
Punjab and the Marathas, apparently to suggest forming an anti-British alliance, although no 
such alliance resulted.112 The principal Burmese aim was to annex the area to the north of 
Arakan. A Burmese Royal Order of 16 September 1817 reveals their claim to a large area 
under British control: ‘It is not correct [for the East India Company] to take Chittagong, 
Panwa (Cossimbazar), Dacca and Murshidabad, as English; they are Arakanese and as 
Burmese has now taken Arakan, these places become Burmese; the English has no right to 
collect taxes there.’113 A similar claim was made in an earlier Royal Order of 18 February 
1817 that also expected the Company to send back all Arakanese fugitives in Chittagong.114 
A combination of frontier troubles and increasingly belligerent designs by the 
Burmese on adjacent British territory led to the first Anglo-Burma War of 1824–1826. The 
war was so significant in opening many new and interesting regions to European access that 
the Government of Bengal published a series of official documents about the war. The 
Oxford Professor of Sanskrit, H. Horace Wilson, was entrusted with the task of collecting, 
editing, and publishing these documents.115 The British defeated the Burmese and the two 
sides met on 3 October 1825 to determine the terms of peace.116 As principal conditions of 
peace, the British demanded the cession of the four provinces of Arakan, and the payment of 
two crores117 of rupees as an indemnification for the expenses of the war. One crore was to be 
paid immediately, and the Tennasserim provinces (the present-day Tanintharyi Region of 
Myanmar, bordering Thailand) were to be retained until the liquidation of the other. ‘The 
109 See, Lewin, 30-32.  
110 Ibid., 32. 
111 Charles Macfarlane, A History of British India, from the Earliest English Intercourse to the Present Time 
(London: George Routledge & Co., 1853), 355. 
112 Myint-U, The Making of Modern Burma, 99. 
113 Than Tun (ed.), The Royal Orders of Burma, AD 1598-1885, part VII (1811-1819) (Kyoto: Kyoto University 
Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, 1988), 136. 
114 Ibid., 103.   
115 See, Wilson, Narrative of the Burmese War, 1824-1826, vii-viii. 
116 The British were represented by Major General Sir A. Campbell, Commodore Sir J. Brisbane, Brigadier-
general Cotton, Captain Alexander, Brigadier McCreagh, Lieutenant-colonel Tidy, and Captain Snodgrass. The 
chiefs representing the government of Ava were Sada Mengyee Maha Mengom-KyeeWoongyee, Munnoo Rutha 
Keogong Lamain Woon, Mengyee Maha Menla Rajah Atwenwoon, Maha Sri Senkuyah Woondok, Mengyee 
Maha Menla Sear Sey Shuagon Mooagoonoon, Mengyee Attala Maha Sri Soo Asseewoon. See, ibid., 204-205. 
117 One crore equals 10 million.  
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court of Ava was also expected to receive a British resident at the capital, and consent to a 
commercial treaty, upon principles of liberal intercourse and mutual advantage.’118 The 
refusal of these demands by the court of Ava, which quite naturally found the idea of 
conceding territories an indignation and the payment of any pecuniary indemnification 
humiliating, led to another round of war and another round of defeat for the Burmese.119 The 
court of Ava finally submitted to British demands and concluded a treaty on 24 February 
1826 allowing the British to annex Arakan and Tennasserim and subsequently incorporate 
them into British India.120   
This was a significant moment in the political future of Burma, for the first-ever 
precise boundaries of Arakan were drawn up by the British in the aftermath of this war. 
Indeed, following the annexation of Arakan by Burma in 1785, the Burmese attempted to 
demarcate boundaries between Mrouk U and Thandwe on the Arakan side and Salin beyond 
the Arakan Mountain Range in the east. As the Royal Order of 14 October 1787 reveals, the 
key motivation for this was to revive the land route from Mrouk U to Ba Ai across the 
Arakan Range. Mrouk U officers were given the responsibility to keep this road open and 
well-maintained down to Dalet, and Thandwe (Sandoway) officers had the same 
responsibilities from Dalet to Ba Ai.121 Therefore, some sort of internal boundary 
demarcation was necessary. Two more Royal Orders, on 26 November 1787 and 14 
December 1787, indicate further attempts at a more detailed account of the demarcation of 
boundaries between Mrouk U, Thandwe, and Salin based on pre-war Arakanese records of 
1783.122 Various local headmen lodged complaints against the proposed demarcation, which 
led to the Royal Order for further investigation into the matter.123 These Burmese attempts at 
boundary demarcation were inward looking and different in nature from what the British 
would achieve following the war of 1825. The boundaries drawn by the British demarcated 
the lines between Arakan, the Burmese Kingdom and the Tennasserim, as well as Arakan’s 
administrative boundary with Bengal.124 In other words, the precise territorial demarcation of 
Arakan and its external boundaries with both the kingdom of Burma and colonial India are 
essentially the creation of the British.  
Burmese defeat in two more Anglo-Burma Wars in 1852 and 1885 resulted in 
complete British control over all of Burma; in 1886 Burma formally became a province of 
British India. Although there was a Rohingya community in Arakan before the Burmese 
invasion of 1785, its size increased rapidly during colonial times as a result of the British 
policy of expanding rice cultivation in Arakan.125 Rice cultivation required intensive labour 
and the need for a trained agricultural workforce was largely met by Muslim workers from 
Bengal. While many of these workers came on a seasonal basis, some settled down 
118 Wilson, Narrative of the Burmese War, 1824-1826, 205. 
119 Ibid., 210-257. 
120 Ibid., 257. See also, Myint-U, The Making of Modern Burma, 100. 
121 Tun (ed.), The Royal Orders of Burma, AD 1598-1885, part IV (1782-1787), 182. 
122 See, ibid., 196, 203. 
123 Ibid., 203. 
124 Myint-U, The Making of Modern Burma, 220. 
125 Final Report of the Advisory Commission, 18. This was in line with the general British colonial policy of 
encouraging settlement cultivation as opposed to the traditional slash and burn cultivation in all hill regions of 
South Asia. This policy was necessary for the colonial administration to ensure a stable generation of revenue. 
See, Shahabuddin, “The Myth of Colonial Protection of Hill Peoples under British Rule,” 210-235. 
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permanently, thereby altering the demographic composition of the area. As various censuses 
of British Burma reveal, from the 1880s to the 1930s the size of the Rohingya community in 
Arakan doubled, from about 13 to 25 percent.126 Around that time, many Rohingyas who left 
Arakan following the Burmese conquest of 1785 returned under British protection.127 The 
same pattern would be seen during WWII: when the Japanese occupied Burma in 1942 and 
expelled the British from Arakan, a sizeable proportion of the Rohingya fled Arakan and took 
refuge in Bengal.128 In this sense, the political fate of the Rohingya since the first Burmese 
conquest of 1785 was linked to the rise and fall of British colonial power.    
It is, therefore, no surprise that in the colonial policy discourse in the 1930s on 
separating Burma from Indian colonial administration and making it a Crown colony, the 
issue of immigration appeared to be the Burmese nationalist leaders’ main concern.129 In the 
British Parliamentary Roundtable Conference of 1931–1932, the statement of delegates 
representing the majority interests of Burma highlights immigration as the root cause behind 
the suffering of the majority.130 The statement concluded that the ‘diseased condition’ of 
Burmese society thus created by uncontrolled immigration could be cured only by severing 
ties with the Indian administration and offering the Burmese the right to self-government.131 
 It soon became clear during the round-table that the delegates representing minority 
interests were not equally keen for the separation from India.132 The delegate for the Indian 
community in Burma demanded ‘adequate and effective representation in the Legislative 
Council and the executive appointments; that it shall have adequate representation in the 
public services of the country, and that the constitution of Burma shall be such as to prevent 
any majority community from abusing their legislative power with a view to enacting laws 
which would create discrimination between one citizen and another.’133 As a rationale, the 
spokesperson for the delegation offered a detailed account of the extent to which the Indian 
community is in charge of many important aspects of Burmese economic life. Ironically, this 
also substantiates the frustrations that the majority delegation expressed in the conference. 
 The British finally separated Burma from British India in 1937, making it a Crown 
colony of Britain, and granted the colony a new constitution calling for a fully elected 
126 Report on the Census of British Burma, Part I: The Enumeration and Compilation of Results, 1881; Report 
on the Census of India 1931, vol. XI: Burma, Part I, 1933. 
127 Ullah, “Rohingya Refugees to Bangladesh,” 143. 
128 E. Pittaway, “The Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: A Failure of the International Protection Regime,” in 
H. Adelman (ed.), Protracted displacement in Asia: No Place to Call Home (Surrey: Ashgate, 2008), 83-106. 
129 The British decision was primarily driven by student uprisings for national autonomy triggered by the world 
depression of the 1930s and the ensuing economic hardship in the country. The decision was also motivated by 
the need to protect the jewel in the crown of the British Empire – India. Burma was seen as a handy buffer zone 
in the face of increasing French presence and influence in Southeast Asia. The separation of Burma from India 
was officially recommended by the authors of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, by the Statutory Commission, 
and by the Government of India. The Burma sub-Committee of the Indian Round Table Conference, 1930 
endorsed the principle of separation. See, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, Proceedings of the 
Burma Round Table Conference, 27 November 1931 to 12 January 1932 (London: His Majesty’s Stationery 
Office, 1932), 18. 
130 Statement read by U Ba Pe, and signed by U Chit Hlaing, U Ba Pe, U Maung Gyee, U Ohn Ghine, U Tun 
Aung Gyaw, U Ba Si, Dr. Thein Maung, Miss May Oung, U Tharrawaddy Maung Maung, Tharrawaddy U Pu 
and U Ni. See, Proceedings of the Burma Round Table Conference, 31. 
131 Ibid., 32. 
132 See generally, Proceedings of the Burma Round Table Conference, 20-25. 
133 Statement read by N. M. Cowasjee. See, ibid., 47.  
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assembly. With this split between British India and British Burma, the border between the 
two took on a semi-international status for the first time.134 In the aftermath of WWII and 
following fierce nationalist resistance to British rule, Burma became ‘an independent 
country’ in January 1948 under the Independence Act (1947) – a British legislation – ‘as a 
country not within His Majesty’s dominions and not entitled to His Majesty’s protection.’135 
However, the boundaries of this newly independent nation, crafted by His Majesty’s colonial 
administration, remained as they were. The semi-international boundaries became the fully 
international borders of Burma. The administrative boundary between Arakan and Bengal, as 
well as Tennasserim’s boundary with Siam (Thailand), became international frontiers of 
postcolonial Burma. As Myint-U asserts, over the first couple of decades of colonial rule in 
Upper Burma following the third Anglo-Burma War of 1885, ‘the remainder of the new 
country’s frontiers were carefully negotiated and surveyed: in deciding what was Assam, 
Burma, Tibet and China, the diplomats and cartographers of Fort Williams [in Calcutta] set 
the Indian–Burmese–Chinese borders of today. Modern Burma thus included the entire 
heartland of the old kingdom […] or the land of the “Myanma”. But the map also included 
some, though not all, of her erstwhile tributaries and frontier regions, as well as places never 
even claimed let alone ruled by the Court of Ava.’136 
Although the kingdom remained independent for hundreds of years before the British 
occupation of Arakan in 1825, and was under Burmese rule for a mere 40 years, the right to 
self-determination or any other alternative political future for the people of Arakan in general 
and the Arakanese Muslims (the Rohingya) in particular was never given a serious thought 
during the decolonisation process although reference to the right to self-determination was 
made on a couple of occasions. On the eve of Burma’s independence, separatist movements 
demanding at least an autonomous status for Arakan as a whole developed from strength to 
strength throughout 1947. A mass meeting held on 15 June 1947 in Rangoon specifically 
highlighted the historical existence of Arakan as an independent Kingdom for nearly 4,000 
years and also its geographical separation by mountains from Burma proper, and concluded 
that should be granted the absolute right of determining her own destiny as an Autonomous 
State.137 When one of the key figures behind such movement, the Buddhist monk U Seinda, 
was arrested, violence broke out all over Arakan to the extent that a combined military and 
police operation was ordered by the Government of Burma. However, the Government 
consistently branded such separatist movements as communist anarchy or even robbery and 
mass looting or simply lawlessness.138 In the British official circle at the Burma Office, 
however, there was an awareness of ongoing separatist movement and the Government of 
Burma’s efforts to obscure it. A Burma Office Minute Paper of 8 July 1947 reveals this 
fact.139 The said Paper also indicates recognition of the relevance and historical basis of the 
134 Ullah, “Rohingya Refugees to Bangladesh,” 141. 
135 Refer to the full title of the Act. See also, Article 1. 
136 Myint-U, The Making of Modern Burma, 220. 
137 India Office Records and Private Papers, ‘Letter from U Hla Tun Pru, Chairman, All Arakan Representative 
Working  Committee to the Secretary of State for Burma, dated 21 June 1947,’ IOR/M/4/2503, 18-19.   
138 See, Government of Burma Press Communique published in The Times of Burma, dated 20 November 1947.  
India Office Records and Private Papers, ‘Law and Order: Arakan (12 April -1 December 1947), IOR/M/4/2503. 
139 India Office Records and Private Papers, ‘Burma Office Minute Paper (B/C 1235/47),’ IOR/M/4/2503, 10-
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Arakanese demand for self-determination. Nevertheless, the British took side with the ruling 
Burmese elites in the Government and discredited the separatist movement as a creation of 
the main Burmese opposition party for their own vested interest.140 The Burma, crafted by the 
British colonial administration including Arakan within its territory, was seen as the only 
natural makeup of the nascent postcolonial state. Importantly, in his note on the Minute Paper 
(dated 9 July 1947), the Under-Secretary for Burma Arthur Henderson specifically mentioned 
that ‘the separatist movement in Arakan as a whole must be distinguished from that among 
the Moslems of North Arakan’ but he never deviated from the perception of Arakanese 
separatism as a menace from political opposition in Burma.141      
The incorporation of Arakan into independent Burma was unfortunately seen as the 
default position. As in the case of many other ethnic minorities within new postcolonial states 
in Africa and Asia, the political future of the Rohingya was thus made permanently 
subordinate to the state of Burma, the latter being the legitimate subject of international law 
and legally protected against challenges to its territorial integrity.142 The postcolonial 
boundaries of present-day Myanmar, unjust and an outcome of colonial imagination and 
convenience, have as their source of legitimacy international law. This is also a stark 
reminder of how international law perpetuates colonial legacies and thereby further 
disempowers already vulnerable groups, such as the Rohingya, leading to humanitarian 
catastrophes. 
However, political resistance to the incorporation of Arakan into Burma was very 
quick to follow. Shortly after Myanmar’s independence in 1948, a rebellion led by Rohingya 
Muslims erupted in Arakan, demanding equal rights and an autonomous Muslim area in the 
north of the state.143 It is also claimed by the Burmese nationalists that at the time of Burma’s 
independence, the Rohingya not only formed their own army but also approached 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah – the key architect of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan – ‘asking him 
to incorporate Northern Arakan into East Pakistan [present-day Bangladesh]’.144 These 
events were in turn used by the Burmese ruling elites as excuses for questioning the 
Rohingyas’ political allegiance to Myanmar. In post-independence Myanmar, the Rohingya 
have always been referred to as ‘Bengali foreigners’ and therefore denied citizenship. It is an 
irony that Myanmar claimed territorial sovereignty over Arakan without actually giving 
citizenship to a section of people, who have been living there long before the creation of the 
state in its present form. The Rohingya currently make up the largest community of stateless 
persons in the world. Myanmar even has an official policy of not using the term “Rohingya”, 
as this might potentially endorse the indigenous origin of the community. During a recent 
meeting with the US Ambassador Scot Marciel in October 2017, the Myanmar army chief 
Senior General Min Aung Hlaing referred to the Rohingya as “Bengalis” and commented that 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid., 12. 
142 See, Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations; General Assembly, Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, Res 2625 (XXV), 25th Session, 24 October 1970. Principles of unilateral 
humanitarian intervention, the responsibility to protect, and remedial self-determination are often seen as 
‘legitimate’ (as opposed to legal) exceptions to the general rule of non-intervention and territorial integrity in 
exceptional cases.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
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British colonialists were responsible for the problem: ‘The Bengalis were not taken into the 
country by Myanmar, but by the colonialists; […] they are not the natives’.145 Since 
independence, various forms of government oppression and the systematic marginalisation of 
the Rohingya have met with organised and armed resistance by a fraction of the Rohingya – 
though the degree and nature of such resistance has varied. The 2017 crackdown in Arakan 
by the Myanmar army, in collaboration with local Rakhine Buddhist civilians, was a brutal 
and disproportionate response to one such armed attack by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation 
Army against Myanmar security forces.      
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
The continuation of colonial boundaries in the politico-legal imagination of postcolonial 
statehood is an established norm of international law. Although some international lawyers 
challenge this general application of the uti possidetis principle as a legally binding rule of 
international law, they nonetheless accept the pragmatic need for this principle for 
maintaining peace and stability. Ironically, as the example of the Rohingya crisis reveals, 
what seemed to be a solution at the time of decolonisation turned out to be a recipe for 
humanitarian catastrophe as the postcolonial nation-building process failed. 
It would be inappropriate to settle on the uti possidetis principle as the obvious reason 
behind this kind of crisis in postcolonial states in general. Various other important elements, 
such as international law’s ambivalence with minority rights, evasiveness vis-à-vis the right 
to self-determination for minority groups, limited involvement with the question of 
citizenship and statelessness, or neo-liberal economic premise, often contribute to this 
situation. There is also a need for further research on how, in the absence of stable democratic 
institutions, nation-building projects and the suppression of ethnic groups go unchallenged in 
postcolonial states. Moreover, it needs to be exposed how, due to its normative reliance on 
individualism as well as weak enforcement mechanisms, international law often fails to offer 
any adequate protection to the vulnerable groups. The Rohingya crisis in Myanmar provides a 
perfect illustration of these arguments, offering a powerful reminder of the deep, enduring 
crisis of postcolonial statehood and its problematic engagement with international law in 
general. The foregoing discussion on the role of international law in the making of 
postcolonial boundaries and the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar sets the necessary premise for 
this potential larger project on postcolonial statehood and international law. The normative 
significance of the present paper beyond the Rohingya crisis lies in this fact. 
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